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I. Introduction
This paper documents a robust stylized fact: the fall in trade caused 
by fi nancial crises is magnifi ed by the time- to- ship goods between the 
origin and the destination country. The paper is motivated by the col-
lapse of world trade that occurred during the fi nancial crisis of 2008 and 
2009 and the debates on why it was much larger than the fall in world 
GDP and demand. But we go further by analyzing the effect of fi nancial 
crises on trade using historical data. The amplifi cation effect of time- to- 
ship is very robust. It is observed at the bilateral level on a large panel 
of countries over the period 1950 to 2009 and at the fi rm level over the 
period 1995 to 2005. We argue that this stylized fact of fi nancial crises 
strongly suggests that they affect trade not only because they impact 
demand but also through fi nancial frictions, which are specifi c to inter-
national trade.
International trade differs from intranational trade in several dimen-
sions. One on which we focus in this paper and that we can interpret as 
a fi nancial friction is time- to- ship.1 It takes time to transport goods in-
ternationally, and we focus on how this fi nancial friction is exacerbated 
during a fi nancial crisis. For instance, a shipment takes more than 28 
days to go from Rotterdam to Hong Kong, but a bit more than one day 
from Rotterdam to Copenhagen. This is without taking into account the 
time to load and unload the boat and the time taken by customs and 
other administrative procedures. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) 
found in a sample of 180 countries that the median amount of time it 
takes from the moment the goods are ready to ship from the factory un-
til the goods are loaded on a ship is 21 days. In “normal” circumstances, 
This content downloaded from 128.135.181.197 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:45:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
226 Berman, De Sousa, Martin, and Mayer
time to load, ship, and so forth implies a transport cost that depends on 
distance, the value, and the weight of the good transported. Of course 
even in normal times, there is an opportunity cost to time that can be 
measured broadly by the cost of capital. However, during a fi nancial 
crisis time- to- ship takes a new dimension: as time passes during which 
goods are stuck on cargo the probability that a fi nancial incident takes 
place in the destination country rises. We model this incident as the 
possibility that during a fi nancial crisis the importer defaults on his or 
her payment obligation. We present a simple partial equilibrium model 
in which heterogeneous exporters sell to distant importers. We show 
that in such a framework the negative impact on trade of the increased 
probability of default that comes with a fi nancial crisis is amplifi ed by 
the time it takes to ship the good. Crucially, time- to- ship does not in 
this case simply represent an extra cost, like transport costs do, it in-
creases the elasticity of export volume to the expected cost of default. 
This is the core of the magnifi cation effect that time- to- ship produces. 
The reason is that exporters react to this increased probability of default 
by raising their export price and reducing their export volumes and 
values, the more so the longer the time of shipping. This can be thought 
of as a pricing- to- market strategy that depends on fi nancial conditions 
in the destination country. Hence, on the intensive margin, the value 
of imports by existing importers falls with a fi nancial crisis, and this is 
more so the longer the time to trade with the exporter country. We also 
show that in such a framework, the probability to exit and cease export-
ing is higher in a country that experiences a fi nancial crisis and that this 
effect is again amplifi ed by time- to- ship.
We test these fi rm- level predictions on fi rm- destination specifi c ex-
port data obtained from the French customs over the period 1995 to 
2005. The fi rm- level data, in addition to the aggregate data, is consistent 
with predictions of the model and the role of time- to- ship. We fi nd that 
French exporters indeed raise their price and decrease their export vol-
umes when the destination country is hit by a crisis. The reduction in 
volume and value is larger when time- to- ship is longer. Similarly, the 
probability that an exporter exits a given destination increases when the 
destination incurs a fi nancial crisis, and more so when time- to- ship is 
longer. Using aggregate data from 1950 to 2009, we fi nd that this magni-
fi cation effect is robust to alternative specifi cations, samples, and inclu-
sion of additional controls, including distance. Both in fi rm level and 
aggregate regressions, when we include both the time- to- ship variable 
and distance, only the effect of time- to- ship remains signifi cant. This 
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suggests that the mechanism that we uncover is indeed due to the role 
of time as a fi nancial friction.
There is a now large and still growing literature on the analysis of 
the trade collapse during the recent fi nancial crisis. Some papers have 
analyzed the characteristics of countries and sectors that were most hit 
by the fi nancial crisis. This is the case of Chor and Manova (2012), who 
analyze the effect that credit conditions had on international trade dur-
ing the recent global crisis by examining the evolution of monthly US 
imports over the November 2006 to October 2009 period, and compare 
trade patterns before and during the crisis. They identify the impact 
of credit conditions by exploiting the variation in the cost of external 
capital across countries and over time, as well as the variation in fi nan-
cial vulnerability across sectors. They fi nd that during the crisis period, 
countries with tighter credit availability exported less to the United 
States, relative to other countries. Another related paper on the effect of 
credit constraints on export performance at the fi rm level is Amiti and 
Weinstein (2011), who show that Japanese banks transmitted fi nancial 
shocks to exporters during the systemic crisis in Japan in the 1990s. 
Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) review evidence that fi nancial factors 
may have resulted in a greater decline in exports than were predicted 
in models without fi nancial frictions. They show that export prices rose 
relative to domestic manufacturing prices across a large number of 
countries. This is consistent with a result we fi nd in a very different data 
set, which is that export prices rise when the destination country expe-
riences a fi nancial crisis. They also fi nd that import and export prices 
of goods shipped by sea, which are likely to be affected most by trade 
fi nance contractions, rose disproportionately more than those shipped 
by air or land. Our paper is complementary to theirs in pushing the 
argument that what we document in this paper resemble footprints left 
by fi nancial friction shocks during a fi nancial crisis. In the same vein, 
Bricongne et al. (2012) fi nd that the exports of French fi rms in more 
external fi nance- dependent sectors were more adversely hit during the 
recent global crisis. However, some economists have downplayed the 
role of trade frictions and trade fi nance when explaining the drop in 
international trade. Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) emphasize the 
disruption of global production lines and the reduction in trade in inter-
mediate goods during the recent fi nancial crisis to explain that the fall 
in trade has been larger than the fall of output and therefore conclude 
that trade fi nance played a minor role in the trade collapse of 2008 and 
2009.2 Eaton et al. (2011) quantify the relative contributions of changes 
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in demand versus changes in trade frictions, using a general equilib-
rium model of production and trade. They also conclude that the fall in 
demand was more important.
Finally, we are not the fi rst to focus on time- to- ship to better under-
stand trade patterns during fi nancial crises. In addition to Levchenko, 
Lewis, and Tesar (2010) already cited, Alessandria, Kaboski, and 
 Midrigan (2010), Ahn (2011), Schmidt- Eisenlohr (2011), Leibovici and 
Waugh (2011), and Kim and Shin (2012) present models with time- to- 
ship frictions. The fi rst shows that this introduction generates inventory 
adjustments that can explain the trade collapse during the latest fi nan-
cial crisis. The mechanism we focus on that generates testable implica-
tions at both the aggregate and fi rm levels is, however, different as it 
does not rely on inventories. Schmidt- Eisenlohr (2011) and Antras and 
Foley (2011) present rich models with time- to- ship that endogenizes the 
choice of trade fi nancing in a situation where default risks exist both for 
exporters and importers.
The paper is organized as follows. We present, in the next section, 
a simple model of international trade with possible importer default, 
and we derive implications of the role of time- to- ship during fi nancial 
crises, at the fi rm and at the aggregate level. In Section III, using ag-
gregate data on bilateral trade on the period 1950 to 2009, we show that 
the negative impact of a fi nancial crisis on trade is magnifi ed by time- 
to- ship between the two countries. Finally, in Section IV, using French 
exporter- level data we test the fi rm- level implications of the model. 
Section V concludes.
II. Model
We present a simple model where a fi nancial crisis generates a fall in 
imports that is more pronounced for country pairs with a longer ship-
ping time. The aim of the model is to provide guidance for our empiri-
cal work and generate simple testable implications at the aggregate and 
at the fi rm levels. The model is in partial equilibrium and the fi nancial 
crisis is considered as an exogenous event. We leave for future research 
the aim of analyzing these issues in a general equilibrium framework. 
We focus on exporters in the Home country who export to many coun-
tries, each of them characterized by the number of periods s it takes to 
ship a good to the Home country.3 Exporters differ in terms of produc-
tivity, φ, as in Melitz (2003).
The model features a fi nancial friction in the form of an exogenous 
probability of default per period, which depends on the state of the 
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economy. Each period, the probability that an importer of country s 
encounters a fi nancial diffi culty and defaults on his payments is qs. If 
the importer defaults, we assume for simplicity that the exporter is not 
paid for the goods he or she has shipped and loses the value of the 
shipment.4 The probability that the payment due is effectively paid is 
therefore (1 – qs)s. The probability that a default occurs during the ship-
ping period increases with the length of shipping.
The probability qs, which characterizes the fi nancial health of coun-
try s, is assumed to be higher during a fi nancial crisis.5 Exporters are 
risk neutral fi rms in monopolistic competition markets and face a price 
elasticity of demand of σ in the markets they export to. They only use 
labor in production and have heterogeneous labor productivity φ. We 
can think of importers as wholesalers who then sell to consumers with 
Dixit–Stiglitz type of utility with love for variety. In this case, σ is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties in the utility function of con-
sumers. The exporter is paid when the goods are delivered. Hence, we 
do not take into account the possibility that the (risk neutral) exporter 
can buy insurance through trade fi nance and bank intermediation and 
we assume she uses open account terms. Importers can—but will not 
always choose to—use letters of credit issued by their banks (the is-
suing bank) as a means of assuring exporters that they will be paid.6 
If the exporter submits the required documentation (invoices, bills of 
lading, etc.) to its bank (the advising or confi rming bank), payment is 
made to the exporter. However, letters of credit are expensive and re-
quire both confi dence and liquidity to provide fi nance and insurance 
about payment to the exporter. The confi rming bank may lack confi -
dence in the issuing bank. Ronci (2004) indeed reports sharp falls of 
trade fi nance during the most important emerging markets fi nancial 
crises of the 1990s. During the 2008 to 2009 fi nancial crisis, the collapse 
of trade fi nance was also blamed for part of the trade collapse. Auboin 
(2009) reports an increase in 2008 in spreads on 90 days’ letters of credit 
from 10 to 16 basis points in normal times to 250 to 500 basis points for 
letters issued by certain “risky” countries. A study by the IMF (2009) 
that surveyed several banks in developed and emerging markets re-
ported a sharp increase in the cost of trade fi nance: 70% of the banks 
reported that the price for letters of credit had risen. In our model, if 
the cost of trade fi nance was to increase with the probability of default 
and a fi nancial crisis, our qualitative results would be similar: higher 
cost of trade fi nance during fi nancial crises would rise exponentially 
with the time- to- ship the goods and would translate in higher mar-
ginal costs and prices in the same manner as in the present model. A 
This content downloaded from 128.135.181.197 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:45:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
230 Berman, De Sousa, Martin, and Mayer
much richer model that endogeneizes the fi nancing mode of interna-
tional trade as a function of default of both importers and exporters is 
provided by Schmidt- Eisenlohr (2011) and Antras and Foley (2011), but 
this extension is beyond the scope of this paper. The exporter’s prob-
lem is therefore to maximize the present value of profi ts of exporting to 
country s: 
 
 
Vs() =
ps()sxs()
(1 + r)s
(1 − qs)s − w sxs() − F, (1)
where the fi rst term is the value of sales discounted by the per period 
interest rate r and the probability of default of the importer. Variable w 
is the wage rate and w/φ the marginal cost of production. Variable F 
is a fi xed cost to export. These costs have to be paid before the export 
takes place. Profi t maximization generates the following optimal price 
and export quantities: 
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
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⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
s
, (2)
 
 
xs() = YsPs
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⎦
⎥⎥
−
, (3)
where Ys and Ps are, respectively, the income of the country and the 
standard welfare- based price index that depends on prices of all lo-
cally produced and imported varieties. The fi rst two elements of the 
price equation (2) are the standard markup and marginal cost of the 
fi rm. The third element is specifi c to our setup and depends on time- to- 
ship. Because the probability of default increases with shipping time, 
the exporter will react by increasing its price and decreasing its export 
quantity for importers at longer shipping times. This is also the case 
because the opportunity cost of funds increases with shipping times 
and the interest rate. The latter represents the cost of borrowing, which 
can rise abruptly for fi rms during a fi nancial crisis. This specifi c predic-
tion of the model (exporters charge higher export prices to destinations 
with higher shipping time) can be related to other models and empirical 
results (see Manova and Zhang 2012, or Martin 2010) who have found a 
similar result but with a different mechanism (additive transport costs, 
for example). Note that if importers differed by their fi nancial situation 
so that each importer had a different probability of default in a given 
country, the exporter would discriminate against less “trusted” im-
porters (importers with lower capital, assets with lower value, a more 
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vulnerable balance sheet, etc.) by a higher price and a lower exported 
quantity. This is what Antras and Foley (2011) fi nd in a recent study on 
poultry exports. Note also, that the reduction of trade, which comes 
from the decision of exporters to raise their price, comes on top of the 
standard demand effect (income Ys in the crisis country falls) and the 
possible effect on the price index Ps, which could come with a sharp real 
depreciation, for example.
A notable implication of our framework is that during fi nancial cri-
ses, fi rm- level export prices should increase whereas fi rm- level export 
volumes and values should fall: exporters discriminate against destina-
tions hit by a fi nancial crisis because the expected marginal revenue 
falls in such destinations. This can be thought of as a pricing- to- market 
strategy that depends on fi nancial conditions in the destination country. 
Both effects on prices and volumes should be magnifi ed by longer ship-
ping time s.7 Crucially, time is by nature different from transaction costs 
such as transport costs (iceberg costs τs in our framework) or asym-
metric information. Time to ship does not simply reduce the expected 
revenues of trading overseas, it increases the elasticity of this expected 
loss to fi nancial risk. 
 
 
∂ps()
∂qs
qs
ps()
=
sqs
1 − qs
, (4)
 
 
∂xs()
∂qs
qs
xs()
= − sqs
1 − qs
   ;   
∂ps()xs()
∂qs
qs
ps()xs()
= − s( − 1)qs
1 − qs
. (5)
Note that in these equations, the transport cost 
 
s , does not appear and 
therefore plays no role in the magnifi cation effect. Time to ship is, in 
interaction with fi nancial risk, of a different nature because it raises the 
elasticity of export volumes to change in fi nancial risk. This will be im-
portant in the empirical section, where we will want to distinguish be-
tween transport costs and time to ship. Note also that in the previous 
equations, we do not take into account the impact that the fi nancial 
crisis may have on export volumes through its effect on the price index 
and the income of the importing country. We will, however, be taking 
this effect into account when we go to the data. There is a threshold 
level of productivity φ, below which the exporter will decide not to 
export (i.e., when Vs the present value of exporting to country s turns 
negative). We call this threshold for country s,  s
*. It can be shown that 
the effect of an increase in the probability of default on this threshold is 
given by: 
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∂s*
∂qs
qs
s*
=
s
 − 1
qs
1 − qs
> 0. (6)
Hence, by raising the probability of default, a fi nancial crisis pushes 
some lower productivity fi rms to exit. Again, this extensive margin ef-
fect is amplifi ed by shipping time.
We are interested in analyzing the impact of a fi nancial crisis that 
raises the overall probability of default of fi rms in the importer coun-
try, qs. It can potentially also increase the interest rate r if the fi nancial 
crisis (as in the case of 2008 to 2009) is a global crisis that raises the risk 
premium. Note that in our framework, the effect of an increase in the 
probability of default and of the interest rate have essentially the same 
qualitative impact.
The model also generates implications at the aggregate level. The 
value of the expected aggregate exports of the Home country to coun-
try s are given by: 
 
 
Xs = s*
∞∫ (1 − qs)sps()xs()dG() = CsYsPs−1 s*
∞∫  −1 1 − qs1 + r
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
s
dG(), (7)
where Cs is a constant. Given the impact of a rise in q, which we inter-
pret as a fi nancial crisis, the impact on exports to country s contains 
three terms: 
 
 
∂Xs
∂qs
qs
Xs
= es +
∂Ys
∂qs
qs
Ys
+ ( − 1) ∂Ps∂qs
qs
Ps
, (8)
where the last two terms refl ect the impact the crisis has on the income 
and the price index of the importer country. We assume that the net ef-
fect of these last two terms is negative. The fi rst term es represents the 
impact of the fi nancial crisis on aggregate trade once the income and 
the price effects have been controlled for.
Assuming a Pareto distribution for φ with k being the Pareto distri-
bution parameter (an inverse measure of productivity heterogeneity) 
we obtain that: 
 
 
es = −s qs1 − qs
− s(k + 1 − )
 − 1
qs
1 − qs
= − sk
 − 1
qs
1 − qs
. (9)
The fi rst term in the fi rst equation is the impact of an increase in the 
probability of default on the intensive margin of exports and the sec-
ond one is the impact on the extensive margin of exports. Hence, the 
theory predicts that, as for the fi rm- level results, an increased probabil-
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ity of default negatively affects aggregate exports and that this negative 
impact is amplifi ed by shipping time, through both the intensive and 
extensive margins.
Several predictions of our model can therefore be tested. At the ag-
gregate level, the negative impact of a fi nancial crisis on the imports of 
the country is amplifi ed by time- to- ship from the source country. Note 
also that a fi nancial crisis in the exporter country, if it raises the cost of 
funding for the exporter, has the same qualitative effect on trade as a 
fi nancial crisis in the importer country: an increase in r has the same im-
pact as an increase in q. In particular, the impact of such funding stress 
on trade should be amplifi ed by time- to- ship.
There are also several predictions of our framework that can be tested 
using fi rm- level data. First, exporters raise their export price in coun-
tries hit by a fi nancial crisis and this is more so the higher time- to- ship 
to the country is affected by the fi nancial crisis (equation [4]). Both the 
volume and the value of the exports at the fi rm level should decrease 
when the destination country is hit by a fi nancial crisis and this effect 
should be amplifi ed by shipping time to destination (equation [5]). Fi-
nally, when a country is hit by a fi nancial crisis, the probability that 
some exporters cease to export to that country increases. Again, ship-
ping time should amplify this increase in exit probability (equation [6]). 
We now take these predictions to the data, starting with the aggregate 
implications.
III.  Time- to- Ship and the Effect of Crises on Trade: 
Country- Level Evidence 
A. Empirical Methodology
We fi rst want to assess the effect of a banking crisis in a country on bi-
lateral imports of this country, and how this effect varies with the time 
it takes to ship goods from each partner country. In this section we do 
this using aggregate trade data. A key issue is how to measure the time 
spent to trade goods internationally. A fi rst possibility is to proxy this 
by geodesic bilateral distance. A second possibility is to use estimates of 
the time needed to ship goods. This is certainly closer to the mechanism 
we want to highlight. It is, however, not perfect as country pairs do not 
transport all goods by sea. Some goods are transported by road and 
others by air. We will try to deal with this issue. But, not surprisingly, 
distance and time- to- ship are closely related and we will analyze how 
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the results differ when we use either or both in the regressions. Our 
baseline estimation takes the form of a standard gravity equation: 
 
ln Xijt = 1 ln Yit + 2 ln Yjt + Tijt + 1BCjt + 2(BCjt × ln
?dij) + ij + 	t + εijt, (10)
where Xijt represents exports from country i to country j at year t, Y is 
GDP, and Tijt contains a set of time- varying bilateral controls, including 
FTA (Free Trade Agreement), currency union, and the real exchange 
rate. In most of the regressions, we include bilateral fi xed effects μij, so 
that time- invariant bilateral characteristics such as time- to- ship or geo-
desic distance, common language, contiguity, or colonial links are cap-
tured (although this specifi cation allows for interactions with the crises 
variable). A dummy variable, BCjt, takes the value of 1 if the destination 
country j experienced a banking crisis during year t, and ln dij is the 
log of bilateral time- to- ship between countries i and j (demeaned such 
that ln dij = 0 for the average value taken by time- to- ship in the sample). 
Finally, ηt represent year dummies and εijt the error term.
Our coeffi cients of interest are γ1 and γ2. The fi rst is expected to be 
negative: a banking crisis decreases imports (even after controlling for 
demand). We will see that γ2 is also estimated to be negative: the nega-
tive effect of banking crises in the destination country is magnifi ed by 
bilateral time- to- ship.
A diffi culty when estimating this specifi cation is that it omits the 
ideal price indexes (or multilateral resistance [MR] indexes, using An-
derson and Van Wincoop [2003] celebrated terminology). The inclusion 
of bilateral fi xed effects μij only partly solves the problem, as these MR 
indexes may vary over time, especially during fi nancial crises. We will, 
therefore, check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of im-
porter and exporter × year dummies. The inclusion of importer × year 
dummies controls for the importer price index that varies over time. It 
prevents from estimating γ1, but our main coeffi cient of interest, γ2, can 
still be identifi ed. Finally, in all estimations standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the destination × year level.8
B. Data
The trade data come from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction 
of Trade Statistics (DOTS).9 It covers the 1950 to 2009 period, which is 
of crucial importance, since this includes the recent fi nancial crisis, as 
well as past crisis episodes. While DOTS lacks data on trade for indi-
vidual goods, it is the only data set containing a panel of worldwide 
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bilateral trade that goes back far enough to offer a good match with 
the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) data set on fi nancial crises dates from 
1800 to 2010. Our fi nal data set includes 185 exporting countries and 69 
importing countries from 1950 to 2009. Table A1 in the appendix lists 
the countries in our sample and indicates the countries covered in the 
Reinhart and Rogoff data set. The lower number of importing countries 
is due to the availability of the fi nancial crises data. Controlling for the 
occurrence of crises in the exporting country results in a signifi cant loss 
of information, but leaves our results unchanged, as we will show later. 
For fi nancial crises, we follow the literature and focus on banking crises 
(and check the robustness of our results with currency crises). Accord-
ing to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011, 1680), a banking crisis is marked by 
two types of events: “(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or 
takeover by the public sector of one or more fi nancial institutions; and 
(2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large- scale 
government assistance of an important fi nancial institution (or group 
of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for 
other fi nancial institutions.” Reinhart and Rogoff ’s data set combines 
various sources. Our fi nal data set contains around a hundred of these 
events, which include both severe and systemic banking crises in their 
classifi cation. The appendix depicts other important characteristics of 
our data set: the frequency of country pairs with a banking crises in the 
destination country is plotted in fi gure A1, the starting dates of the cri-
ses are shown in table A2, and the mean differences in covariates with 
and without banking crises are reported in table A4.
GDPs come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Since WDI starts in 1960 and does not contain information for 
some countries (e.g., Taiwan or Russia before 1989), we complement 
WDI with estimates provided by Angus Maddison.10 The data on FTAs 
are mainly constructed from three main sources: (a) table 3 in Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007); (b) the World Trade Organization (WTO) website;11 
and (c) qualitative information contained in Frankel (1997). The data 
on currency unions (CU) are an updated and extended version of the 
list provided by Glick and Rose (2002).12 Bilateral real exchange rate is 
computed based on Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 
2011). Bilateral distance is calculated as the population- weighted great 
circle (geodesic) distance between the largest cities of the two countries 
and come from the CEPII distance database, as well as common (of-
fi cial) language, contiguity, common colonizer, and colonial relation-
ships.13
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We use the data of Feyrer (2011) on time- to- ship to get a measure of 
the time it takes to trade between countries. The time required to travel 
from any oceanic point to each of its trading partners is calculated by 
Feyrer (2011) using very detailed geographic data to reconstruct short-
est shipping routes, and assuming a speed of 20 knots. Feyrer’s data 
set covers 130 out of our 185 exporting countries and 59 out of our 69 
importing countries. Thus, to avoid losing information on fi nancial cri-
ses, we expand and amend his data set. Not surprisingly, the correlation 
between Feyrer’s time- to- ship estimate and geodesic bilateral distance 
is high (.88). Not surprisingly either, the largest deviations are for con-
tiguous countries. For those pairs of countries, we replace the time- to- 
ship value by the “time- to- road” based on the geodesic distance and as-
sumed a speed of 60 knots.14 Feyrer’s sample also excludes landlocked 
countries and other countries such as Belgium. To recover bilateral in-
formation for those countries, we identifi ed their closest primary port.15 
Then, for each landlocked country, we computed a time- to- road to that 
port and added the time- to- ship for each given destination. In robust-
ness checks, we also run regressions using the simple geodesic dis-
tance as a proxy for the time it takes to trade between two countries, as 
well as the original Feyrer’s time- to- ship.
Finally, we will also check the robustness of our results to the in-
clusion of fi nancial development, proxied by the ratio of private credit 
over GDP from the WDI between 1960 and 2009.
C. Results
Baseline results. We want to study whether the fall in trade caused by a 
fi nancial crisis in the destination country is magnifi ed by time- to- ship 
between the origin and the destination country. Table 1 presents our 
baseline results, based on the estimation of different specifi cations of 
equation (10). In columns (1) and (2), we replace the country- pair fi xed 
effects (μij) with directional exporter and importer fi xed effects. In col-
umns (3) to (9), we include bilateral fi xed effects (μij). Additionally, in 
column (6), we control for importer × year, and in column (7) for both 
importer × year and exporter × year fi xed effects.16
The coeffi cients on the standard gravity determinants are signifi cant 
and of the expected signs. When including country- pair fi xed effect, a 
banking crisis in the destination country is found to signifi cantly de-
crease bilateral exports, although the size of the effect is moderate: be-
tween –5.8% (exp(–0.06) – 1) and –7.7% (exp(–0.08) – 1) in columns (3) 
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to (5). Time- to- ship, however, magnifi es the response of trade to bank-
ing crises: the interaction term between the banking crisis dummy and 
bilateral time- to- ship is negative and signifi cant at the 1% level (in col-
umns [2] and [4] to [7]). To give an order of magnitude, a one standard 
deviation increase of time- to- ship from the mean magnifi es the effect of 
a banking crisis on imports from –7 to –10% in column (4).
To ensure that our results are not due to the correlation of time- to- 
ship with other bilateral characteristics that affect the response of trade 
to crises, we include in column (5) a number of additional interaction 
terms between bilateral variables (FTA, common currency, common 
language, common legal origin, and contiguity) and distance. Some of 
these interactions are indeed signifi cant: for instance, a crisis in a desti-
nation country has a larger negative impact on bilateral trade if the two 
countries belong to the same trade agreement or currency union. These 
two effects are interesting and somewhat surprising. They suggest that 
our results on time- to- ship do not refl ect the impact of fi nancial crises 
on more fragile trade relations between countries that are both distant 
and without monetary or trade agreements. The interaction term on 
time- to- ship is unaffected by these controls.
The amplifi cation effect of time- to- ship is remarkably stable when 
we include importer × year (column [6]) or both importer × year and 
exporter × year dummies (column [7]). In columns (8) and (9) of table 1, 
we check whether the recent fi nancial crisis has a different effect on 
trade compared with past crisis episodes. We thus split the banking 
crisis dummy into two variables: a dummy for the recent crisis, after 
2007, and a dummy for previous crises. The recent crisis is found to 
have reduced trade more strongly (for a given fall in GDP and other 
controls): –30% (exp (–0.36) – 1) for the recent crisis versus –2% (and 
statistically insignifi cant) for past crisis (column [8]). The magnifi cation 
effect of time- to- ship is, however, similar for crises before and after 2007 
(column [9]).
Robustness. In table 2 we replicate the main estimations of table 1 in-
cluding dummies for banking crises in the exporter countries as well as 
an interaction term between these dummies and time- to- ship. Again 
we include either exporter and importer dummies (columns [1] and 
[2]), country- pair fi xed effects (columns [3] and [4]), country- pair and 
importer × year (column [5]), or country- pair, importer × year, and ex-
porter × year fi xed effects (column [6]).
Our baseline results are again unaffected: the interaction term be-
tween banking crisis in the importer country and time- to- ship is still 
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negative and signifi cant. A banking crisis in the exporter country has 
a slightly positive or insignifi cant impact on exports depending on 
the specifi cation, a result consistent with Abiad, Topalova, and Mishra 
(2011). However, the interaction term between banking crisis in the ex-
porter country and the time- to- ship is negative (columns [2] and [4] to 
Table 2 
Crises, Time- to- Ship, and Exports
Dependent Variable 
Model  
ln Bilateral exports 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
ln GDP originit 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 1.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP destinationjt 0.87*** 0.87*** 0.83*** 0.84***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FTAijt 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.51*** 0.47***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Common currencyijt 0.10b 0.09b 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.37*** 0.34***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln Real exchange rateijt 0.003 0.003 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.52***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ln time- to- shipij –0.88*** –0.85***
(0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisis in 
destinationjt
–0.03* –0.06*** –0.05*** –0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Banking crisis in originit 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.010)
Banking crisisjt × ln time- 
to- shipij
–0.11*** –0.06*** –0.06*** –0.07***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisisit× ln time- 
to- shipij
–0.08*** –0.02** –0.03*** –0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 185,948 185,948 185,948 185,948 185,948 185,948
Country- pair fi xed 
effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter and importer 
fi xed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Importer × year fi xed 
effects No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter × year fi xed 
effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination- year. Year dum-
mies are included in all estimations. Time- to- ship is demeaned. In columns (1) and (2), 
estimates of time- invariant bilateral variables (contiguity, common language, common 
colonizer, colony, common legal origin) are not reported.
*** Signifi cant at the 1% level.  
** Signifi cant at the 5% level.
* Signifi cant at the 10% level.
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[6]). This may be interpreted in light of our model if a banking crisis in 
the exporter country is an indication of funding stress for exporters. In 
equation (7), note that an increase in the interest rate at which exporters 
borrow has the same qualitative effect as an increase in the probability 
of default in the importer country. Both effects on trade are amplifi ed 
by time- to- ship. A banking crisis is a rough indicator of the diffi culty 
and cost of borrowing for exporters, but the result is suggestive of the 
same type of mechanism as the probability of default of importers on 
which we focus.
In table 3, we conduct several robustness tests starting from regres-
sion (3) in table 1. So all regressions include country- pair fi xed effects 
and year dummies. One might argue that our results are driven by an 
increase in the elasticity of trade to time- to- ship over time.17 As the 
number of banking crises increases over time (see fi gure A1 in the ap-
pendix), this could bias our results. Our amplifi cation effect of time- 
to- ship might also capture the fact that crises have become both more 
frequent and distant over time. In regression (1) in table 3, we include a 
full set of interactions between year dummies and our crisis variable (to 
control for their increased frequency) and between year dummies and 
time- to- ship (to control for its potential increased impact over time). As 
shown in column (1), the interaction between crises and time- to- ship 
remains signifi cant at the 1% level.
In regression (2), we replace the measure of time- to- ship that we ex-
panded from Feyrer (2011) by his original measure, which implies the 
loss of many observations. In regression (3), we use simple distance as 
an alternative measure for time- to- ship. The effect is similar in both 
cases. Distance and our measure of time- to- ship are very correlated, but 
as explained before, differ for certain pairs of countries, in particular 
contiguous ones. Remember that our theoretical framework generates a 
radically different role for trade costs, such as distance, and for time- to- 
ship. Both distance and time- to- ship, because they increase trade costs, 
reduce trade fl ows but only time- to- ship raises the elasticity of trade to 
fi nancial risk. In order to check whether distance per se or time- to- ship 
is at the source of our main results, we include both interaction terms in 
regression (4). As predicted by theory, the distance interaction loses its 
signifi cance but the time- to- ship interaction remains similar in size and 
very signifi cant. This suggests that time- to- ship and not distance is at 
the source of our amplifi cation result. In regression (5), we include an 
interaction term between time- to- ship and the GDP of the destination 
country. The objective is to check whether the time- to- ship amplifi ca-
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tion effect comes from a demand effect of the fi nancial crisis that lowers 
income. We see fi rst that in periods with low GDP, importer countries 
import relatively more from countries with higher time- to- ship. More 
importantly, the interaction term between time- to- ship and the banking 
crisis is not much affected. In regression (6), we use an alternative mea-
sure of fi nancial risk in the destination country and replace the banking 
crisis dummy by a currency crisis dummy (also coming from Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2011). We see that the interaction term with time- to- ship 
exhibits a similar effect. In regression (7), we interact both the bank-
ing crisis dummy and the currency crisis with time- to- ship. Estimates 
are both signifi cant and quantitatively similar. This suggests that other 
fi nancial risks, such as currency crises, which may also put into danger 
international payments, have similar effects to banking crisis. Finally, 
in the last regression, we check whether our time- to- ship measure does 
not capture the effect of a distance between the fi nancial development 
of the trade partners that could amplify the impact of the fi nancial crisis 
on their trade. The time- to- ship interaction term remains very signifi -
cant in this case.
Table A5 in the appendix reports further robustness checks. Time- 
to- ship may be correlated with importer or exporter characteristics 
that affect their responses to fi nancial crises. We therefore interact the 
banking crisis dummy with the economic size (GDP) or the fi nancial 
development level of the importer or the exporter. We fi nd that a crisis 
in the importing country has a larger negative effect when the exporter 
is economically smaller (column [1]), or when the importer is economi-
cally larger (column [2]) and more fi nancially developed (column [4]). 
Moreover, when the exporter is a developing country, a crisis in the 
importing country has a more negative effect on trade (column [5]). 
This is consistent with Berman and Martin (2012) who fi nd that exports 
of Sub- Saharan African countries are hit harder than average when a 
crisis occurs in their partner countries. In regression (6), we add inter-
action terms between regions for the origin country and the banking 
crisis dummy in destination to check whether our results are due to a 
specifi c region in the world. We see this is not the case. In that table, it is 
worth noting that, across specifi cations, the estimate of the interaction 
between crisis and time- to- ship remains highly signifi cant and remark-
ably stable.
In fi gure A2 in the appendix, we test whether the effect of banking 
crises on imports and the magnifi cation effect of time- to- ship builds up 
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through time; that is, if these effects are amplifi ed as the crisis lasts. We 
start from our baseline specifi cation (table 1, column [4]), but replace 
the crisis variable by a set of dummies representing the number of years 
since the crisis started. More precisely, we split our crisis variable into 
four dummies that equal 1, respectively, if the importer country is (a) in 
the fi rst year of the crisis; (b) in the second to fourth year; (c) in the fi fth 
to the ninth year; or (d) if the crisis started 10 or more years before. We 
further interact these bins with the (demeaned) time- to- ship variable. 
Figure A2, part (a) plots the deviation of bilateral imports during a cri-
sis depending on its duration. The x- axis represents the “natural” trade 
level as given by the gravity equation, and the fi gure can therefore be 
interpreted as the deviation from this level. The 90% confi dence inter-
vals are depicted by dotted lines around the estimated effect. Figure 
A2, part (b) represents the magnifi cation effect of time- to- ship. Both 
the average effect of the crisis and the effect of time- to- ship are found 
to increase (in absolute value) as the crisis lasts. This can be understood 
as follows: a crisis destroys imports, which deviate from their natural 
level; as long as the crisis continues, more trade is destroyed and trade 
moves further away from its natural level.
Finally, in the appendix, we present further evidence of the ampli-
fi cation effect of time- to- ship on sectoral trade. The negative effect of 
time- to- ship is observed in various sectors, suggesting that our results 
are not due to composition effects.
IV. Firm- Level Evidence
Data. We use the fi rm- destination specifi c export data from the French 
customs over the period 1995 to 2005. This database reports the volume 
(in tons) and value (in euros) of exports for each product (combined no-
menclature) and destination, for each fi rm located on the French metro-
politan territory. Unit values are computed as the ratio of export value 
divided by export volume. These are, therefore, imperfect measures of 
export prices. Some shipments are excluded from this data collection. 
Inside the European Union (EU), fi rms are required to report their ship-
ments by product and destination country only if their annual trade 
value exceeds the threshold of 150,000 euros. For exports outside the 
EU all fl ows are recorded, unless their value is smaller than 1,000 euros 
or one ton. Those thresholds only eliminate a very small proportion of 
total exports. As unit values and export volumes can be noisy, we clean 
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the data by dropping the observations for which the yearly growth rate 
of one of these variables was in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution, 
computed by year.
We match this data set with Reinhart and Rogoff’s banking crises 
data in destination countries between 1995 and 2005. Moreover, as we 
want to estimate variants of the specifi cation (10) for French fi rms ex-
ports, we add destination- specifi c variables, such as GDP, real exchange 
rate, FTA, and common currency (euro) (see Section III, subsection B, 
for details on the construction of these variables). For time- to- ship, we 
use the same methodology and source as in the previous section. In this 
section, we only use time- to- ship between France and the countries it 
exports to. In a previous version of the paper we also had computed a 
time- to- ship measure from a different source: we computed the amount 
of time (in days) required to ship from France’s main sea port (Le Havre) 
to each of the destination countries’ main sea ports. The data come from 
Sea Rates, a sea- freight broker based in Miami, Florida (http://www
.searates.com). Sea Rates provides the estimated shipping time, which 
depends on the actual itinerary of the ship and takes into account the 
crossing of international canals such as Panama, Suez, and also the 
Saint Lawrence seaway or the Kiel canal linking the North sea to the 
Baltic sea. Our results are very similar to those obtained with Feyrer 
data so we do not report them here. They are available upon request.
Results. We assess the impact of fi nancial crises in the destination 
countries on the intensive and extensive margins on trade at the fi rm 
level. We also estimate whether this impact is magnifi ed by shipping 
time. Table 4 depicts the results on the intensive margin. Columns (1) 
to (3) report the estimations on unit values, columns (4) to (6) on export 
volumes, and columns (7) to (9) on export values. Note that similar 
results are obtained when the log of destination GDP is included in 
the unit value regressions (columns [1] to [3]), which is not required 
theoretically. All columns show within estimations since they include 
fi xed effects at the fi rm- destination level. Year dummies are also 
added.
Consistent with our theory, French fi rms are found to react to a fi nan-
cial crisis in the destination country by increasing their prices (column 
[1]), and decreasing their export volumes and values (columns [4] and 
[6]). This suggests, therefore, that there is pricing- to- market that re-
sponds to the fi nancial condition of the destination country—in this spe-
cifi c case, the increased risk that comes with a fi nancial crisis. All these 
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effects are signifi cant at the 1% level. Unit values increase by around 3% 
on average (column [1]), and export volumes decrease by 12% (column 
[4]). This leads to a 9% decrease in export values (column [7]). Time- to- 
ship affects the way in which quantities and values react to crises, in a 
way consistent with the model and our aggregate results: the drop of 
exports is larger for destinations with higher time- to- ship (columns [5] 
and [8]). On unit values, however, the coeffi cient on the interaction term 
between crises and time- to- ship is not statistically signifi cant (columns 
[2] and [3]).
Interestingly, when we include both distance and time- to- ship in our 
estimations (except in column [3]), only the interaction with time- to- 
ship remains signifi cant (despite the very high correlation between the 
two variables)—at the 5% level in column (6) and at the 10% level in 
column (9).
The impact of longer time- to- ship on the effect of fi nancial crises is 
also signifi cant quantitatively. To give an idea of the magnitude of the 
effect, in column (5) an increase in time- to- ship from 10 to 20 days mag-
nifi es the drop of export volumes during a fi nancial crisis from –1% to 
–8% (–12% for 30 days of time- to- ship). For export values, the effect is 
insignifi cant for 10 days but drops to –6% for 20 days, and up to –10% 
after 30 days (column [8]).
Table 5 contains the results on the extensive margin. We estimate the 
probability that a given fi rm exits from a given destination, and how 
it depends on the occurrence of banking crises and other destination- 
specifi c variables. We either use fi xed effect logit estimations (columns 
[1] to [3]) or linear estimations with fi rm- destination fi xed effects (col-
umns [4] to [6]). Note that as these are within estimations, any fi rm- 
destination that contains only zeros or ones is not considered. Again, 
in all estimations year dummies are included. The dependent variable 
is the probability that a fi rm i does not export to a destination j during 
year t, conditional on exporting in t – 1.
Unsurprisingly, a crisis increases the probability to exit a given desti-
nation in the year of the fi nancial crisis. The average effect is, however, 
quantitatively low: in column (4), the exit probability increases by less 
than 4 percentage points during crises episodes. This is consistent with 
Bricongne et al. (2012) who fi nd that during the 2008 to 2009 fi nancial 
crisis, most of the fall in exports by French fi rms was due to the inten-
sive margin. Note, however, that this effect comes on top of the income 
drop that itself increases the exit probability. As predicted by theory, the 
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effect of the fi nancial crisis on the exit probability is amplifi ed by higher 
time- to- ship (columns [2], [3], [5], and [6]).
V. Conclusion
This paper has documented a robust stylized fact, and discussed a pos-
sible mechanism underlying it. When a country is hit by a fi nancial 
crisis, its imports decrease more when the time- to- ship to the partner 
country is higher. It was the case during the recent trade collapse, but 
also in past crises. At the aggregate level, this result is robust to the 
inclusion of various controls or to the use of alternative estimators. It is 
also observed at the sectoral level and at the fi rm level on a large panel 
of French fi rms over the period 1995 to 2005. The effect of crises in desti-
nation countries is magnifi ed at both the intensive (export volumes and 
values) and the extensive margin (exit probability) levels.
What is the reason behind this magnifi cation effect of time- to- ship? 
Table 5 
Crises and Exports: Firm- Level Results, Extensive Margin
Dependent 
Variable Model  
Pr(Exitijt > 0) 
FE Logit LPM
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Estimator 
Banking crisisjt 0.219*** 0.026 0.027 0.038*** –0.003 –0.002
(0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
ln GDPjt –1.841*** –1.859*** –1.866*** –0.293*** –0.298*** –0.299***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Real Exchange 
Ratejt
–0.769*** –0.773*** –0.778*** –0.172*** –0.173*** –0.173***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Banking crisisjt × 
Shipping timej
0.191*** 0.273*** 0.040*** 0.042***
(0.021) (0.037) (0.005) (0.009)
Banking crisisjt × 
ln distancej 
–0.098*** –0.003
(0.036) (0.008)
Observations  1,717,848 1,717,848 1,717,848 1,717,848 1,717,848 1,717,848
Notes: Standard errors (robust for linear probability model, or LPM, estimations) in pa-
rentheses. Pr(Exitijt > 0) is the probability that a fi rm i does not export to market j during 
year t, conditional on positive exports in year t – 1. Year dummies and fi rm- destination 
fi xed effects are included in all estimations.
*** Signifi cant at the 1% level.  
** Signifi cant at the 5% level.
* Signifi cant at the 10% level.
This content downloaded from 128.135.181.197 on Fri, 30 May 2014 11:45:11 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
250 Berman, De Sousa, Martin, and Mayer
We argue that the time- to- ship amplifi cation may be considered as a 
footprint left by a fi nancial friction specifi c to international trade. The 
risk associated with longer shipping time is heightened during fi nancial 
crisis, as is the probability that an importer defaults on his payment ob-
ligation increases as time passes. Our model has implications at the fi rm 
level on exporter prices, quantities, and entry- exit adjustment during 
fi nancial crises that are broadly consistent with the data. Importantly, 
time- to- ship in our framework is not only a trade cost, it increases the 
elasticity of trade to fi nancial risk.
The mechanism that we analyze may have larger implications for 
how fi nancial frictions and risk both at the aggregate and at the indi-
vidual level affect trade patterns, especially at the business cycle fre-
quency.18 In particular, interest rate changes and exchange rate volatility 
may affect international trade through this mechanism and be ampli-
fi ed by time- to- ship. We leave these theoretical and empirical questions 
for future research.
Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Fig. A1. Share of observations with banking crises, by year
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Table A1 
List of Countries
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeriaa 
Angolaa 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentinaa 
Armenia 
Australiaa  
Austriaa  
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgiuma  
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Boliviaa 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazila 
Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canadaa 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republica 
Chad 
Chilea 
Chinaa 
Colombiaa 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Ricaa 
Cote D’Ivoirea 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Czechoslovakia 
Dem. Rep. 
of the Congo 
Denmarka 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republica 
Ecuadora 
Egypta 
El Salvadora 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finlanda 
Former Soviet 
Union 
Francea 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germanya 
Ghanaa 
Greecea 
Grenada 
Guatemalaa 
Guinea 
Guinea- Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Hondurasa 
Hong Kong 
Hungarya 
Icelanda  
Indiaa  
Indonesiaa 
Iran 
Iraq 
Irelanda 
Israel 
Italya 
Jamaica 
Japana 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenyaa 
Kiribati 
Korea (Republic of)a 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macau 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysiaa 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritiusa 
Mexicoa 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Moroccoa 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlandsa 
New Zealanda 
Nicaraguaa 
Niger 
Nigeriaa 
Norwaya 
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panamaa
Papua New Guinea
Paraguaya
Perua
Philippinesa
Polanda
Portugala
Qatar
Romaniaa
Russian Federationa
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines
Samoa
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singaporea
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africaa
Spaina
Sri Lankaa
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Swedena
Switzerlanda
Syria
Taiwana
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailanda
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Tunisiaa
Turkeya
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab 
Emirates
United Kingdoma
United Statesa
Uruguaya
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuelaa
Vietnam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambiaa
Zimbabwea
aCountries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) historical data set on fi nancial crises. 
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Table A2 
Banking Crises, Starting Dates
Country  Crises (start)  Country  Crises (start)
Algeria 1990 France 1994,2008 
Angola 1992 Korea (Republic of) 1983,1986,1997
Argentina 1980,1989,1995,2001 Malaysia 1985,1997
Australia 1989 Mauritiusa —
Austria 2008 Mexico 1981,1994
Belgium 2008 Morocco 1983
Bolivia 1987,1994 Netherlands 2008
Brazil 1963,1985,1990,1994 New Zealand 1987
Canada 1983 Nicaragua 1987,2000
Central African 1976,1988 Nigeria 1992,1997
 Republic     Norway 1987,1991
Chile 1976,1980 Panama 1988
China 1992 Paraguay 1995,2002
Colombia 1982,1998 Peru 1983,1987,1999
Costa Rica 1987,1994 Philippines 1981,1997
Cote d’Ivoire 1988 Poland 1991
Denmark 1987,2008 Portugal 2008
Dominican Republic 1996,2003 Romania 1990
Ecuador 1981,1998 Russian Federation 1995,1998,2008
Egypt 1981,1990 Singapore 1982
El Salvador 1989 South Africa 1977,1989
Finland 1991 Spain 1977,2008
Germany 1977,2008 Sri Lanka 1989
Ghana 1982,1997 Sweden 1991
Greece 1991,2008 Switzerland 2008
Guatemala 1991,2001,2006 Taiwan 1983,1995
Honduras 1999,2001 Thailand 1979,1983,1996
Hungary 1991,2008 Tunisia 1991
Iceland 1985,1993,2007 Turkey 1982,1991,1994,2000
India 1993 United Kingdom 1974,1984,1991,1995,
 2007
Indonesia 1992,1997 United States 1984,2007
Ireland 2007 Uruguay 1971,1981,2002
Italy 1990 Venezuela 1978,1993
Japan 1992 Zambia 1995
Kenya  1985,1992  Zimbabwe  1995
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
aMauritius faced various currency crisis with the following starting dates: 1979, 1981, 
1983, 1997.
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Table A3 
Time- to- Ship between France and the 68 Destination Countries 
Country  
Number 
of Days  Country  
Number 
of Days
Algeria 7.2 Korea (Republic of) 45.1
Angola 20.3 Malaysia 33.8
Argentina 26.2 Mauritius 29.3
Australia 48.4 Mexico 21.0
Austria 12.1 Morocco 5.4
Belgium 0.2 Netherlands 1.0
Bolivia 31.1 New Zealand 47.0
Brazil 21.7 Nicaragua 22.7
Canada 13.6 Nigeria 17.2
Central African Republic 19.1 Norway 2.9
Chile 30.9 Panama 19.8
China 43.5 Paraguay 26.8
Colombia 18.4 Peru 25.5
Costa Rica 21.7 Philippines 39.8
Cote D’Ivoire 15.2 Poland 4.4
Denmark 3.2 Portugal 4.0
Dominican Republic 16.3 Romania 13.5
Ecuador 23.0 Russian Federation 6.3
Egypt 12.8 Singapore 34.5
El Salvador 23.3 South Africa 25.3
Finland 5.7 Spain 0.7
Germany 0.3 Sri Lanka 28.1
Ghana 16.2 Sweden 2.8
Greece 11.3 Switzerland 0.3
Guatemala 23.5 Taiwan 40.3
Honduras 23.0 Thailand 37.8
Hungary 12.2 Tunisia 8.6
Iceland 5.6 Turkey 12.1
India 26.3 United Kingdom 0.5
Indonesia 35.6 United States 13.6
Ireland 2.1 Uruguay 25.8
Italy 0.8 Venezuela 17.4
Japan 46.5 Zambia 31.1
Kenya 26.2 Zimbabwe 30.9
Average (number of days): 19.4     
Notes: The primary source for time- to- ship data is Feyrer (2011). Details about our exten-
sion are given in the text.
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Aggregate Robustness
Sectoral Evidence
This appendix presents further evidence of the banking crises and the 
amplifi cation effect of time- to- ship on sectoral trade. To run our anal-
ysis, we use a constructed data set of 26 International Standard Indus-
trial Classifi cation (ISIC, Revision 2) three- digit industries, 181 export-
ing countries, and 69 importing countries. The list of sectors and ISIC 
codes are tabulated in table A6. The country coverage is the same as in 
the aggregate- level analysis. Table A1 lists countries in our sample and 
indicates countries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) data set. 
Again, the lower number of importing countries is due to the avail-
ability of the banking crises data. However, the time period coverage is 
shorter from 1980 to 2009 instead of 1950 to 2009.19
Table A6 presents the results of the estimates of the interaction term 
Table A4 
Mean by Categories of the Banking Crises Dummy
Banking 
Crisisjt  ln Exportsijt ln Distanceij Contiguity  
Common 
Language  
0 15.75 8.63 0.03 0.16 
1 16.00 8.69 0.03 0.14 
Total 15.78  8.64  0.03  0.16   
Common 
Colonizer  Colony  
Common 
Legal Origin FTA  
Common 
Currency
0 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.06 0.01 
1 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.07 0.01 
Total  0.04  0.03  0.36  0.06  0.01 
Fig. A2. Time- to- ship and the duration of fi nancial crises
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between the banking crisis dummy and time- to- ship, sector by sector, 
for the period 1980 to 2009. The specifi cation is the same as the one used 
in column (2) of table 1 with country and time fi xed effects, as well as 
controls for the bilateral and unilateral factors affecting trade. Overall 
estimates are available upon request.
Table A6 
Crises, Time- to- Ship, and Exports: Sectoral Evidence
Industry  
ISIC
Code 
Estimate of 
Banking crisisjt 
× ln time- to- shipij 
Clustered 
Standard 
Errors  Observations
Beverages 313 –0.093*** 0.025 88,838
Mach. elec. 383 –0.091*** 0.026 143,642
Prof/Sci 385 –0.087*** 0.023 121,974
Machines 382 –0.087*** 0.024 151,935
Food 311 –0.085*** 0.020 143,115
Oth. Chem. 352 –0.084*** 0.025 125,391
Tobacco 314 –0.083*** 0.028 41,561
Transport 384 –0.074*** 0.022 126,479
Ind. Chem. 351 –0.072*** 0.021 130,492
Printing 342 –0.062*** 0.022 111,875
Glass 362 –0.057*** 0.021 92,892
Rubber 355 –0.055** 0.023 100,947
Nf metals 372 –0.052** 0.021 100,550
Nonmetal 369 –0.042* 0.022 91,468
Paper 341 –0.040* 0.024 100,526
Metal prod. 381 –0.036* 0.022 134,867
Plastic 356 –0.033 0.026 109,972
Wood 331 –0.027 0.018 104,221
Textiles 321 –0.017 0.023 142,457
Pottery 361 –0.012 0.021 82,052
Iron/steel 371 –0.011 0.023 99,436
Petroleum 353 0.006 0.024 72,338
Apparel 322 0.019 0.024 125,436
Footwear 324 0.021 0.025 79,901
Leather 323 0.025 0.022 100,221
Furniture  332  0.026  0.023  92,536
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination- year. Each row 
reports the sectoral estimate of the interaction Banking crisisjt × ln time- to- shipij. The 
specifi cation is the same as the one used in column (2) of table 1, including ln GDPit, ln 
GDPjt, FTAijt, Common currencyijt, ln Real Exchange Rateijt, ln Time- to- shipij, Banking cri-
sis in destinationjt, Contiguityij, Common languageij, Common colonizerij, Colonyij, Com-
mon legal originij, as well as importer, exporter, and year dummies. Time- to- ship is de-
meaned. The sample period is 1980 to 2009. See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry
/regcst.asp?Cl=8& Lg=1 for a description of the ISIC Revision 2 industries. 
*** Signifi cant at the 1% level.
** Signifi cant at the 5% level.
* Signifi cant at the 10% level.
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The estimates of the interaction term between the banking crisis 
dummy and time- to- ship are sorted according to their magnitude. More 
than half of the estimates are signifi cant and in line with the aggregate 
point estimates of table 1. The largest amplifi cation effects are found in 
the divisions 31 (manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco) and 38 
(manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment). 
In contrast, no amplifi cation effect is found in the division 32 (textile, 
wearing apparel, and leather industries).
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1. We are not the fi rst to analyze the implications of this characteristic of international 
trade (see, e.g., Amiti and Weinstein [2011] and Feyrer [2011] for the most recent contribu-
tions).
2. Interestingly, in another paper, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) fi nd results that 
are very much related to ours on the role of shipping time on US trade data during the 
2008 to 2009 fi nancial crisis. They fi nd that the fall of US imports (but not exports) dur-
ing the fi nancial crisis period (Q2:2008 to Q2:2009) was larger for countries with longer 
time- to- ship. They also fi nd that sectors with higher shares of imports shipped by ocean 
(relative to air shipping) experienced larger drops.
3. For a general equilibrium model of time- to- ship that analyzes how the variation in 
the rate at which agents are willing to substitute across time affects how trade volumes 
respond to changes in income and prices, see Leibovici and Waugh (2011).
4. In reality, the penalty may not be as harsh, except of course in the case of perishable 
goods. If the goods can be shipped back from the destination the cost of the fi nancial inci-
dent will be lower, but our main conclusions will remain qualitatively similar.
5. Some heterogeneity on the dimension of the importers, in particular on their fi nan-
cial health, could be added, but this would not change the results fundamentally.
6. Antras and Foley (2011) use a detailed transaction level data from a US- based ex-
porter of frozen and refrigerated food products, primarily poultry, to describe broad pat-
terns about the use of alternative fi nancing terms. The most commonly used fi nancing 
terms do not involve direct fi nancial intermediation by banks. They are cash in advance 
terms and open account terms; these are used for 44.0% and 39.2% of the value of transac-
tions, respectively. Cash in advance terms require the importer to pay before goods are 
shipped. Open account terms allow a customer to pay a certain amount of time following 
receipt of the goods.
7. For simplicity, we investigate the effect a marginal increase in qs, which may increase 
more sharply during a fi nancial crisis.
8. Note that our results are robust to clustering at the country- pair level.
9. See Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010, appendix A) for details on the compilation of trade 
fl ows from DOTS and other gravity variables. We mostly rely on the same procedures 
here, with updated data.
10. See http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.
11. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
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12. Programs for constructing data on FTA and CU are available at http://jdesousa
.univ.free.fr/data.htm.
13. See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
14. This speed represents a reasonable average between a slower truck speed and a 
faster train speed.
15. The data comes from http://www.e- ships.net/ports.php.
16. For regressions (6) and (7), we make use of Guimaraes and Portugal’s (2010) algo-
rithm to estimate models with high- dimensional fi xed effects.
17. Time- to- ship is highly correlated with distance, and the impact of distance on trade 
has been shown to increase over time (Disdier and Head 2008).
18. As shown theoretically by Martin and Rey (2006), an increase in trade frictions dur-
ing fi nancial crises may increase the likelihood of a fi nancial crisis. This points to a mecha-
nism where fi nancial crises and trade frictions are jointly and endogenously determined.
19. See de Sousa, Mayer, and Zignago (2013) for more details on the construction of 
the sectoral data set from 1980 to 2006. We expanded this data set until 2009 to cover the 
most recent fi nancial crisis.
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